This is such an important topic that is rarely understood, let alone commented on, in scientific circles. As Alfred Korzybski stated, "the map is not the territory" and "the word is not the thing." I think the lack of recognition of this distinction is a huge problem in the social sciences, where conventional labels are often treated—at least behaviorally, based on people's actions—as natural kinds.
There is a profound difference between the labels used in physics and molecular biology, which are typically precise and discrete, versus those in the social sciences (which often carry unquestioned assumptions that are not empirical facts). You bring up obesity as a good example. I think this is a much bigger problem than is acknowledged, though.
How about 'disorder' in clinical psychology and psychiatry? The concept of a 'disorder' is a philosophical frame, NOT an empirical fact. The same with 'mental illness' (including psychological suffering in an enlarged category which was, prototypically, just used for phenomena that were caused biologically, could be transferred biologically, and that didn't suddenly vanish through a conversation, for example). And yet, any therapist with any level of real skill knows that a client can enter with a session with a diagnosed 'mental illness' and walk out at the end of the same session no longer meeting the (artificial) criteria for it (Schizophrenia being an obvious counterexample, showing that members of the same category can respond far more differently than the label might suggest on the surface). Often it takes several sessions, and often the same result happens through a change in life / social circumstances, but regardless it's still qualitatively a different experience than that of cancer, diabetes, etc. I think it's deeply counterproductive when we confuse the map and the territory. As start, we could start specifify what's implicit--what X calls Y. E.g. you meet the criteria for what, currently, is labeled as 'obseity' by [the national society of XYZ]. At least that makes clear there is a difference beweetn map-territory. Any disagreements?
P.S. To be fully accurate, there obviously are some Conventional Labels in molecular biology. E.g. 'gene'. The term, 'gene', is still far more empirically based, precise, and reflecting 'reality' than psychological labels though.
Hi Eric,
This is such an important topic that is rarely understood, let alone commented on, in scientific circles. As Alfred Korzybski stated, "the map is not the territory" and "the word is not the thing." I think the lack of recognition of this distinction is a huge problem in the social sciences, where conventional labels are often treated—at least behaviorally, based on people's actions—as natural kinds.
There is a profound difference between the labels used in physics and molecular biology, which are typically precise and discrete, versus those in the social sciences (which often carry unquestioned assumptions that are not empirical facts). You bring up obesity as a good example. I think this is a much bigger problem than is acknowledged, though.
How about 'disorder' in clinical psychology and psychiatry? The concept of a 'disorder' is a philosophical frame, NOT an empirical fact. The same with 'mental illness' (including psychological suffering in an enlarged category which was, prototypically, just used for phenomena that were caused biologically, could be transferred biologically, and that didn't suddenly vanish through a conversation, for example). And yet, any therapist with any level of real skill knows that a client can enter with a session with a diagnosed 'mental illness' and walk out at the end of the same session no longer meeting the (artificial) criteria for it (Schizophrenia being an obvious counterexample, showing that members of the same category can respond far more differently than the label might suggest on the surface). Often it takes several sessions, and often the same result happens through a change in life / social circumstances, but regardless it's still qualitatively a different experience than that of cancer, diabetes, etc. I think it's deeply counterproductive when we confuse the map and the territory. As start, we could start specifify what's implicit--what X calls Y. E.g. you meet the criteria for what, currently, is labeled as 'obseity' by [the national society of XYZ]. At least that makes clear there is a difference beweetn map-territory. Any disagreements?
P.S. To be fully accurate, there obviously are some Conventional Labels in molecular biology. E.g. 'gene'. The term, 'gene', is still far more empirically based, precise, and reflecting 'reality' than psychological labels though.